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Checks and Balances on the Fifth Branch of 
Government: Colorado Environmental Coalition v. 
Wenker and the Justiciability of the Federal  
Advisory Committee Act 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2001, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) 
published a call for nominations to fill fourteen vacancies on 
Resource Advisory Councils (“RACs”) in Colorado.1 The RACs are 
made up of private citizens who help the BLM develop 
environmental and public land use policies throughout the state. 
Shortly after the announcement, the BLM received nearly fifty 
applications for the positions, complete with the required letters of 
reference from the applicants’ represented interests. Fifteen days 
after the announced deadline for nominations, Colorado Governor 
Bill Owens sent a letter to the Colorado Director of the BLM with a 
list of thirteen names the Governor wished to nominate for the RAC 
positions. However, the letter included no letters of reference or any 
other documentation supporting the nominations. When the BLM 
announced the appointments, all thirteen of Governor Owens’ 
nominees and only one of the other fifty nominees had been 
selected. 
Two of the rejected applicants and two environmental groups 
challenged the BLM’s action in federal court for, among other 
things, failing to ensure “that the advice and recommendations of 
the advisory committee . . . not be inappropriately influenced . . . by 
any special interest.”2 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit held that the issue was not subject to judicial review 
because the decision of whom to appoint to the RACs was 
“committed to agency discretion by law.”3 This Note argues that the 
Tenth Circuit erred by disregarding Congress’s intent with respect to 
 1. See Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2004).
 2. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(3) (2000). 
 3. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 
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agency selections of advisory committee members and that such 
agency decisions should be subject to judicial review. 
These events and the court’s subsequent holding highlight one 
of the primary concerns of administrative law in today’s regulatory 
state—the danger of agency capture. According to some theories, 
agency capture occurs when regulated industries come to dominate 
the government entities charged with regulating them.4 Thus, much 
of administrative law deals with the nature and scope of judicial 
review of agency actions, providing a check on federal regulatory 
agencies—the so-called “fourth branch” of government.5 However, 
regulated industries may succeed in an alternative or “backdoor” 
approach to agency capture through use of the numerous but 
relatively unknown federal advisory committees, which some have 
called the “fifth branch” of government.6 Advisory committees are 
essentially private groups that perform research and make 
recommendations to government agencies. Although these 
committees can provide important expertise, their members 
represent private interests and may offer biased opinions slanted in 
favor of the interests they represent. 
In 1972 Congress, concerned with the proliferation and 
potential misuse of advisory committees, passed the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (“FACA”).7 Among FACA’s provisions, Congress 
included two key requirements for creating advisory committees: 
 4. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050–52 (1997). 
 5. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth 
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 
1987 DUKE L.J. 387. 
 6. See 117 CONG. REC. H2750 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1971) (statement of Rep. 
Monagan), reprinted in FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT (PUBLIC LAW 92-463), 
SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 259–60 (1978) 
[hereinafter SOURCE BOOK]; Allan J. Stein, FOIA and FACA: Freedom of Information in the 
‘Fifth Branch’?, 27 ADMIN. L. REV. 31 (1975). 
To avoid confusion, it should be pointed out that the term “fifth branch of 
government” has been applied to a variety of other public, quasi-governmental institutions. 
See, e.g., Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and Their 
Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165 (1989) (applying the term to private 
regulators such as the Better Business Bureau, the National Association of Security Dealers, 
and the American Bar Association); William P. Fuller, Congressional Lobbying Disclosure Laws: 
Much Needed Reforms on the Horizon, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 419, 420 (1993) (applying 
the term to the lobbying industry). 
 7. Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 2 
(2000)). 
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first, that “membership of the advisory committee . . . be fairly 
balanced in terms of the points of view represented”8 and second, 
that “the advice and recommendations of the advisory committee 
. . . not be inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or 
by any special interest.”9 In Colorado Environmental Coalition v. 
Wenker,10 the Tenth Circuit addressed whether the BLM’s selection 
of the Governor’s nominees as RAC members was subject to judicial 
review under these two provisions or “committed to agency 
discretion”11 and therefore not justiciable under the Federal 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Ultimately, the court 
decided that while the “fair balance” provision of FACA was 
justiciable, the “inappropriate influence” provision was not because 
Congress had provided “no meaningful standard against which to 
judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”12 However, a brief review 
of FACA’s legislative history and related cases demonstrates that 
Congress did provide such a standard and that the court diverged 
from its own precedent by not looking to the legislative history for 
that standard. In addition, the court may have missed an opportunity 
in this case to clarify an important distinction between these two 
FACA provisions, which would show why each provision should 
independently present a justiciable issue. 
This Note gives an overview of how the justiciability of agency 
actions is treated in the APA and by the courts, a brief explanation of 
FACA, and how the issue of justiciability has been addressed in other 
FACA cases. Part III briefly reviews the facts and the court’s 
reasoning in Colorado Environmental Coalition v. Wenker. Part IV 
then analyzes the court’s conclusions and offers legal and policy-
based support as to why the Tenth Circuit should have considered 
both of the relevant FACA provisions to be justiciable issues. Finally, 
Part V concludes with a brief summary and outlook. 
 8. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2). 
 9. Id. § 5(b)(3). 
 10. 353 F.3d 1221, 1227 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 11. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 
 12. Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1231 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 
(1985)). 
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE APA AND FACA 
While courts have generally acknowledged a strong presumption 
in favor of judicial review of agency actions,13 Congress provided in 
the APA for nonreviewability in certain narrow circumstances.14 
Unfortunately, the APA does not make very clear when those 
circumstances apply. The courts therefore have had to grapple with 
the determination of when to apply the APA’s nonreviewability 
provisions to challenges of agency actions. However, the courts have 
not always come to clear consensus on when to grant judicial review 
of agency decisions under the APA, particularly for claims of FACA 
violations. For example, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued three separate opinions on the 
justiciability of FACA provisions under the APA.15 This Part will 
review the relevant provisions of the APA and FACA and outline 
some of the various diverging judicial opinions that deal with these 
provisions. 
A. Justiciability of Agency Actions Under the APA 
By the end of World War II, Congress saw that the vast array of 
federal agencies it had created to regulate various industries needed 
closer regulation itself. Therefore, in 1946 Congress passed the 
Administrative Procedure Act to govern all federal agency 
procedures, based partly on the notion that superb procedures would 
lead to superior substantive results. Congress also hoped to make 
agencies more accountable for the use of authority it had delegated 
to them. In more recent decades, growing distrust of agency use (or 
abuse) of that authority has led to calls for courts to apply stricter 
scrutiny when reviewing agency actions.16 Since the APA governs 
 13. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (“[J]udicial review of 
a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason 
to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.”). 
 14. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), (2). 
 15. See Pub. Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 
886 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 16. See, e.g., 5 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & JOHN P. WILSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 28 (2d ed. 1984); CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: 
RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990); MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO 
GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1988); SENATE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 79th 
Cong., 1944–46 (1946); Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 
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judicial review of agency decisions, most courts have interpreted the 
APA to allow for broad judicial review. This Section reviews the APA 
provisions that dictate when judicial review is not to be granted and 
how courts have applied those provisions. 
1. Foreclosure of judicial review in the APA 
The APA sets out two circumstances under which a court may 
not legally review an agency’s action. The first circumstance, defined 
in section 701(a)(1) of the APA, occurs when congressional “statutes 
preclude judicial review.”17 The second appears in section 701(a)(2) 
and occurs when an “agency action is committed to agency 
discretion by law.”18 Legal scholars have debated much over this 
second provision for several reasons. First, it seems to create an 
inherent inconsistency with section 706 of the APA, which requires 
courts to “set aside agency action . . . found to be arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.”19 The APA fails to explain how courts can review an agency 
action for abuse of discretion in accordance with section 706 if the 
agency’s decision is committed to agency discretion and therefore 
non-reviewable under 701(a)(2).20 Second, the statutory language 
itself is ambiguous. While the APA protects from review decisions 
“committed to agency discretion by law,” it fails to define what “by 
law” encompasses. Absent some explicit pronouncement from 
Congress, courts must determine for themselves whether an agency’s 
decision falls within the agency’s protected discretion “by law.” 
These two apparent conflicts have led one commentator to suggest 
that Congress passed section 701(a)(2) of the APA merely as a 
COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1965); Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE 
L.J. 965, 966 n.9 (1969) (citing to eight previous works in an ongoing debate between 
Professors Berger and Davis, discussing judicial review of agency actions); James V. DeLong, 
New Wine for a New Bottle: Judicial Review in the Regulatory State, 72 VA. L. REV. 399 
(1986); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 469 (1986); Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447 (1986). 
 17. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). 
 18. Id. § 701(a)(2). 
 19. Id. § 706(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
 20. See, e.g., Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, supra note 16, at 
60. 
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political compromise21 and intended for it to have no force of law 
other than what the courts are willing to give it.22
2. How the courts have approached non-reviewability under the APA 
In accordance with the general policy favoring judicial review of 
agency actions mentioned above, courts have construed the APA 
provisions that bar review very narrowly. The United States Supreme 
Court briefly addressed the ambiguities in these provisions in 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.23 In that case, the 
Secretary of Transportation was required by statute to consider 
“feasible and prudent” alternative routes before building a highway 
through a downtown public park.24 The Court rejected the notion 
that the Secretary’s failure to do so constituted a decision 
“committed to agency discretion” not reviewable under section 
701(a)(2) of the APA.25 Instead, the Court called that provision “a 
very narrow exception,” interpreting it to apply only “in those rare 
instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a 
given case there is no law to apply.’”26 Under this new standard, the 
Court found that the statutory terms “feasible and prudent 
alternative” supplied adequate “law to apply” and that the 
Secretary’s decision was thus not “committed to agency discretion,” 
but instead subject to review.27 This standard turns out to be narrow 
indeed since agencies can generally act only when Congress delegates 
power to them by statute,28 and courts can nearly always point to 
such an enabling statute as “law to apply.” 
The Court eased this narrow test somewhat in Heckler v. 
Chaney.29 There, the Court declined to review the Food and Drug 
Administration’s (“FDA”) refusal to grant a petition from prison 
inmates to enforce standards for the drugs used in death penalty 
 21. Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. 
L. REV. 689, 698 (1990). 
 22. Id. at 699. 
 23. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
 24. Id. at 405 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (2000)). 
 25. Id. at 410. 
 26. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945)). 
 27. Id. at 413. 
 28. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section I: From Nondelegation to 
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2099 (2004).  
 29. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
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lethal injections.30 Ultimately, the Court distinguished agency action 
from inaction and concluded that since the FDA chose not to do 
something, the presumption switched to no review—a presumption 
that the inmates failed to overcome.31 In regards to the standard set 
in Overton Park, the Court explained that section 701(a)(2) of the 
APA cuts off review of a decision “committed to agency discretion” 
when the relevant “statute is drawn so that a court would have no 
meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of 
discretion.”32 Thus, even if a statutory grant of authority to an 
agency arguably provides “law to apply,” a court needs at least some 
further guidance from Congress on how to proceed if the court is to 
review an agency’s decision. 
In Webster v. Doe,33 the Supreme Court further expanded this 
test by looking beyond the plain statutory text for indications of 
guidance from Congress. In Webster, the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency had terminated a homosexual employee whom 
he considered to be a security risk.34 The Court held that the 
Director acted within his discretion under section 701(a)(2) of the 
APA because the National Security Act allowed the Director to take 
such actions whenever he “shall deem such termination necessary or 
advisable.”35 The Court looked not only to the statutory language, 
but also to the “overall structure” of the statute to conclude that the 
statute “fairly exude[d] deference” to the Director, whose decision 
was thus not subject to review.36
As it stands today, the Supreme Court’s section 701(a)(2) 
jurisprudence interpreting when agency action is “committed to 
agency discretion” requires a finding of nonjusticiability, not when 
there is simply “no law to apply,” but when there is no judicially 
meaningful standard by which to review the issue. While the 
Supreme Court has considered statutory language and “overall 
structure” in making this determination, the Tenth Circuit has gone 
 30. Id. at 823. 
 31. Id. at 831. 
 32. Id. at 830 (emphasis added). 
 33. 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
 34. Id. at 595. 
 35. Id. at 600 (quoting National Security Act § 102(c), 50 U.S.C. § 403(c) (2000)). 
 36. Id.; see also Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) (holding that Indian Health 
Service’s decision to cancel a regional clinical services program in favor of a nation-wide 
program was “committed to agency discretion by law” and thus not reviewable by the courts). 
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even further and included consideration of “the structure of the 
statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature 
of the administrative action involved.”37 Thus, at least in the Tenth 
Circuit,38 courts may look much further than the simple text for 
suggestions that Congress intended to leave the decision at issue up 
to the agency’s discretion and consequently nonreviewable by a 
court. 
B. A Brief Overview of FACA 
In 1972, Congress passed legislation39 aimed at reigning in what 
it saw as a potentially dangerous expansion of government—advisory 
committees.40 An advisory committee, as defined in FACA, is 
essentially any private body created by a statute or by a government 
actor that makes recommendations to a government decision maker, 
especially federal agencies.41 Presumably, these private bodies are 
composed of prominent figures in their respective fields who, will be 
able to supply agencies with valuable research and expertise, allowing 
the agency to make more informed decisions. However, Congress 
had grown concerned with many aspects of advisory committees, 
including their dramatic proliferation, lack of accountability, and 
increasing drain on the federal budget.42
In particular, some members of Congress were worried that 
advisory committees might serve as a device for surreptitious agency 
capture. Special interests seeking to influence agency decision 
making could “load” advisory committees with their own 
representatives, who would make recommendations to promote their 
 37. Am. Bank v. Clarke, 933 F.2d 899, 902 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Block v. Cmty. 
Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984)). 
 38. The applicability of the Tenth Circuit’s expansion to courts in other circuits is in 
question here because the court applied this test in a section 701(a)(2) case (“committed to 
agency discretion”) even though the Supreme Court’s language it quoted comes from a case 
dealing with section 701(a)(1) of the APA (preclusion of judicial review). 
 39. The Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 2 (2000)). 
 40. See Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and 
Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451 (1997); Richard O. Levine, The Federal Advisory 
Committee Act, 10 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 217, 225 (1973); Stein, supra note 6, at 34. 
 41. See 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 3. 
 42. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017 (1972); S. REP. NO. 92-1098 (1972). Many of these 
same concerns are ongoing. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL 
ADVISORY COMMITTEES: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE COULD HELP AGENCIES BETTER ENSURE 
INDEPENDENCE AND BALANCE (2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04328.pdf. 
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agendas—agendas that may be contrary to the public interest.43 In 
response to these concerns, FACA includes two key provisions: First, 
under section 5(b)(2), any legislation or charter that establishes an 
advisory committee must “require the membership of the advisory 
committee to be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view 
represented and the functions to be performed.”44 Second, under 
section 5(b)(3), “appropriate provisions [must] assure that the advice 
and recommendations to the advisory committee will not be 
inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or by any 
special interest.”45 These dual provisions constitute Congress’s 
attempt to prevent advisory committees from becoming a “nesting 
place”46 from which special interests could engage in “backdoor” 
agency capture. 
C. Justiciability of FACA Provisions under the APA 
Predictably, courts have been asked to review agency actions 
under FACA. As agencies have created advisory committees, 
individuals and organizations have challenged the organization of 
those committees under FACA’s section 5(b)(2) “fair balance” 
provision and section 5(b)(3) “inappropriate influence” provision. 
Courts have consequently had to decide whether to review the 
agencies’ decisions or to decline to review them if “committed to 
agency discretion” under the APA.47 The various diverging opinions 
on this question have created something of a legal quandary, 
including three separate opinions from a three-judge panel of the 
D.C. Circuit48 and opposite conclusions by the Fifth and Tenth 
Circuits.49
A panel of the D.C. Circuit engaged in a thorough discussion of 
the justiciability under the APA of FACA’s “fair balance” and 
 43. See CONG. REC. S14, 644–55 (1972). 
 44. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2). 
 45. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(3). This Note refers to section 5(b)(2) as the “fair balance” 
provision, and to section 5(b)(3) as the “inappropriate influence” provision. 
 46. CONG. REC. S14, 644–55 (1972), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 6, at 
205. 
 47. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 
 48. See Public Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 
886 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 49. Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1232 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing 
Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 339 n.30 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
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“inappropriate influence” provisions in Public Citizen v. National 
Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods.50 In that 
case, plaintiffs challenged the composition of a Department of 
Agriculture advisory committee under sections 5(b)(2) and 5(b)(3) 
of FACA; they claimed that all the committee members had strong 
ties to the food industry and that none represented public health or 
consumer interests.51 The district court dismissed the complaint, 
holding that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the advisory 
committee was improperly balanced in terms of viewpoints or 
inappropriately influenced by any special interest.52 The plaintiffs 
then appealed to the D.C. Circuit, and in three separate opinions, 
Judges Friedman, Silberman, and Edwards each took a different 
approach as to both the justiciability of the claims and to the 
outcome on the merits.53 A brief summary of their positions may 
serve as a helpful guide: Judge Friedman implied justiciability and 
affirmed the lower court’s dismissal on the merits.54 Judge Silberman 
also affirmed the dismissal but argued that neither of the provisions 
should be justiciable and never reached the merits.55 Finally, Judge 
Edwards argued that the claims should be justiciable and the district 
court’s dismissal reversed on the merits.56
Each of the D.C. Circuit Judges’ opinions in Microbiological 
Criteria gives insight into how courts should approach whether to 
review FACA challenges to advisory committees under the APA. 
Although Judge Friedman did not directly address the issue of 
justiciability, his analysis of the case under the “fair balance” and 
“inappropriate influence” provisions provides an important 
explanation of what each provision requires.57 Quoting from FACA’s 
legislative history, Judge Freidman explained that to be “fairly 
balanced” an advisory committee’s membership should be 
“representative of those who have a direct interest” in the 
committee’s work.58 He further explained that the “inappropriate 
 50. 886 F.2d 419. 
 51. Id. at 420–21. 
 52. Id. at 421. 
 53. Id. at 420–38. 
 54. Id. at 420–26 (Friedman, J., concurring). 
 55. Id. at 426–31 (Silberman, J., concurring). 
 56. Id. at 431–38 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 57. Id. at 422–25 (Friedman, J., concurring). 
 58. Id. at 423 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-1098, at 9 (1972)). 
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influence” provision was “designed to protect against ‘the danger of 
allowing special interest groups to exercise undue influence upon the 
Government’” by dominating the membership of an advisory 
committee59—essentially the agency capture theory. These 
explanations help clarify what FACA provisions mean and why they 
should be justiciable, as this Note discusses below in Part IV. 
Judge Silberman’s opinion in Microbiological Criteria strongly 
articulates the arguments against justiciability.60 Based on the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Heckler, Judge Silberman argued that 
the relevant FACA provisions provide “no meaningful standard 
against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion” and are 
therefore not justiciable under the APA.61 He first addressed the “fair 
balance” provision, pointing out that those terms are nowhere 
defined in the statute and reasoning that courts cannot determine 
whether undefined requirements have been met.62 He then turned to 
the “inappropriate influence” provision, arguing that it was meant to 
“prevent ‘inappropriate’ external influences on an already constituted 
advisory committee” and that it “presupposes that an advisory 
committee is already in existence and ‘fairly balanced’ in accordance 
with section 5(b)(2).”63 Thus, according to Judge Silberman, 
“inappropriate influence” is unrelated to committee membership, 
which is only an issue in claims of “unfair balance.”64 He then argued 
that even if “inappropriate influence” were related to membership, 
the term “special interest” was too “value-laden [and] undefinable” 
to provide a meaningful standard of review.65 These arguments were 
echoed by the Tenth Circuit in this Note’s principal case and are 
further discussed in Part IV below. 
Finally, Judge Edwards in his partial dissent vigorously argued 
that the “fair balance” claim presented a justiciable issue.66 He 
contended that the strong presumption favoring judicial review is 
not overcome just because “the ‘fairly balanced’ requirement falls 
short of mathematical precision in application, or . . . may involve 
 59. Id. at 425 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017, at 6 (1972)). 
 60. Id. at 426–31 (Silberman, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. at 426 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)). 
 62. Id. at 426–30. 
 63. Id. at 430. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 432–34 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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some balancing of interests.”67 However, despite his enthusiastic 
defense of section 5(b)(2)’s “fair balance” provision, Judge Edwards 
inexplicably failed to address section 5(b)(3)’s “inappropriate 
influence” provision. His silence may have implied an intention to 
include 5(b)(3) when he found section 5 as a whole to be justiciable. 
Judge Edwards did say that “the alleged violation of section 5”—
which he identified at the beginning of his opinion as section 
5(b)(2), (3)68—was “also judicially cognizable.”69 This 
characterization does not explain, however, why Judges Friedman 
and Silberman both addressed each provision separately while Judge 
Edwards did not. Alternatively, Judge Edwards may have agreed 
with Judge Silberman’s view that 5(b)(3) deals only with external 
influences on committee recommendations and is unrelated to 
committee membership. Judge Edwards said that one of the 
concerns Congress had when it enacted FACA was that 
“governmental officials would be unduly influenced by industry 
leaders” on committees, but that this concern “prompted Congress 
to enact the ‘fairly balanced’ provision.”70 If this characterization of 
Judge Edwards’s opinion is accurate, then he may have avoided 
discussing 5(b)(3) because he viewed 5(b)(2) as both justiciable and 
an independently sufficient basis for upholding the section 5 claims. 
Whichever reading is correct, Judge Edwards did not discuss the 
“inappropriate influence” provision, so his opinion is ultimately 
inconclusive as to its justiciability. 
Some of the confusion arising from the D.C. Circuit’s three-way 
split in Microbiological Criteria has carried over into other circuit 
court opinions. For example, the Fifth Circuit may have drawn 
unwarranted conclusions from the D.C. Circuit’s divergent opinions 
when it decided Cargill, Inc. v. United States.71 In Cargill, several 
mine owners challenged a decision by the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”) to entrust one of its 
scientific advisory committees with peer reviewing a study on the 
health effects of diesel exhaust on underground miners.72 The 
plaintiffs alleged violations of FACA, including the “fair balance” 
 67. Id. at 434. 
 68. Id. at 432. 
 69. Id. at 437. 
 70. Id. (emphasis added). 
 71. 173 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 72. Id. at 328. 
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and “inappropriate influence” provisions.73 Holding in favor of 
NIOSH on FACA claims, the Fifth Circuit relied on the opinions of 
Judges Friedman and Edwards in Microbiological Criteria to find 
both of these two provisions to be justiciable under the APA.74 With 
respect to the “fair balance” provision, that reliance appears to be 
justified. Judge Edwards strongly supported that view,75 and Judge 
Friedman’s opinion was at least consistent with it.76 With respect to 
5(b)(3)’s “inappropriate influence” provision, however, that reliance 
appears to have been misplaced. The Fifth Circuit engaged in no 
analysis of 5(b)(3)’s justiciability but purported in a footnote to 
“follow the Microbiological Criteria majority,” citing to Judges 
Friedman and Edwards’ opinions.77 As discussed above, Judge 
Friedman implied but did not directly address the justiciability of 
5(b)(3), and Judge Edwards failed to discuss it at all. While Justice 
Edwards’s opinion may be read to imply justiciability of 5(b)(3) by 
its discussion of 5(b)(2), it may also reasonably be read to deny it. In 
either case, by relying on Microbiological Criteria, the Fifth Circuit 
also likely imported the same uncertainty. 
In sum, there appears to be no consensus in this fractured area of 
law. Of the two circuit court opinions that have addressed whether 
the “inappropriate influence” provision is justiciable, one has no 
clear majority, and the other relies solely on the first. These cases are 
important, however, because they provide a basis for analyzing the 
issue in the principal case Colorado Environmental Coalition v. 
Wenker. 
A brief review of this background on the APA and FACA 
provides the necessary context to a discussion of Wenker. First, 
courts have generally acknowledged a strong presumption favoring 
judicial review of government agency decisions. The APA mandates 
no review, however, of decisions “committed to agency discretion by 
law,”78 which the Supreme Court has interpreted to mean that there 
 73. Id. at 327, 337–38. 
 74. Id. at 335, 339. 
 75. Microbiological Criteria, 886 F.2d at 432–34 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 76. Id. at 423–25 (Friedman, J., concurring). 
 77. Cargill, 173 F.3d at 339 n.30 (citing Microbiological Criteria, 886 F.2d at 425 
(Friedman, J., concurring); id. at 432–34 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part)). 
 78. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000). 
4ABBOTT.FIN 11/18/2005 1:10 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
1060 
  
must be “no meaningful standards by which to judge the agency’s 
exercise of discretion.”79 Some courts have dealt with whether this 
applies to FACA, which governs federal advisory committees. Under 
FACA, advisory committees must be “fairly balanced” in terms of 
viewpoint and function and may not be “inappropriately influenced 
. . . by any special interest.”80 Courts must therefore determine 
whether these FACA provisions provide a meaningful standard for 
courts to apply and are thus subject to judicial review under the 
APA. 
III. COLORADO ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION V. WENKER 
A. The Facts 
In March 2001, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM” or 
“the agency”) published in the Federal Register a call for 
nominations for private citizens to serve on Resource Advisory 
Councils (“RACs”) in Colorado.81 RACs are designed to provide for 
a balance of private interests to make land use policy 
recommendations to the BLM.82 They are governed by the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”), under which they must, among 
other things, “be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view 
represented”83 and “not be inappropriately influenced by the 
appointing authority or by any special interest.”84 
The Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act85 (“FPLMA”) and BLM regulations,86 
was to fill fourteen vacancies in the Colorado RACs.87 The BLM 
received nearly fifty applications for the RAC positions by the 
 79. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). 
 80. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2), (3). 
 81. Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2004); see 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1739 (2000) (statutory provision directing the Secretary of the Interior to establish Resource 
Advisory Committees). 
 82. See Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1224. For more information on the BLM’s Colorado 
Resource Advisory Councils, see Bureau of Land Management, Resource Advisory Councils, 
Colorado, http://www.blm.gov/rac/co/co_index.htm. 
 83. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2) (2000). 
 84. Id. § 5(b)(3). 
 85. 43 U.S.C. § 1739 (2000). 
 86. 43 C.F.R. § 1784 (2005). 
 87. Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1226. 
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announced deadline, complete with letters of reference from 
represented interests, as required in the regulations.88 Fifteen days 
after the deadline for receiving nominations, the Governor of 
Colorado sent a letter to the BLM in which he recommended 
thirteen individuals to serve on the RACs.89 However, the Governor 
did not include letters of reference for any of his recommendations.90 
Nevertheless, when the BLM announced the Secretary’s 
appointments, all thirteen of the Governor’s recommendations and 
only one of the prior applicants were selected to serve on the 
RACs.91
B. The Procedural Setting 
In response to the BLM’s apparent bias favoring the Governor’s 
nominees, two rejected applicants and two environmental groups 
brought an action in Federal District Court, challenging the 
nominations and seeking to enjoin RAC meetings on three counts.92 
First, they argued the nominations were improper because the 
nominees lacked the requisite letters of reference from interest 
groups.93 Second, they claimed that the Governor would have an 
“inappropriate influence” over the RACs, in violation of section 
5(b)(3) of FACA because he chose thirteen of the fourteen 
appointees.94 Finally, they alleged that by appointing a 
disproportionate number of the Governor’s nominees, the Secretary 
had violated the requirement that the RACs “be fairly balanced in 
terms of the points of view represented,” under section 5(b)(2).95
The district court dismissed the case on two grounds. It held first 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing for failure to show injury-in-fact, 
and second that the relevant provisions of FACA were not justiciable 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. The regulations provide that the Secretary is to “consult” with the Governor on 
appointments to the RACs. 43 C.F.R. § 1784.6-1(e) (2005). 
 90. Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1226. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.; see also Colorado Environmental Coalition et al., Briefing Packet on Unlawful 
2001 Resource Advisory Council Process, at http://www.ourcolorado.org/alerts/ 
041802_racpacket.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2005) (setting out the plaintiffs’ principal 
arguments for challenging the advisory committee appointments). 
 93. Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1226. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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for being “too vague to provide a meaningful standard of review” 
under APA standards.96
C. The Tenth Circuit’s Holding 
The Tenth Circuit remanded the case, holding that while the 
two rejected applicants for RAC positions had standing, the 
environmental groups did not.97 The court also held that the failure 
of the agency’s regulations requiring letters of reference was 
principally for the benefit of the agency and failure to enforce it did 
not substantially harm the plaintiffs; thus, the requirement was not 
judicially enforceable.98 Most importantly, the court held that while 
the FACA provision that membership of advisory committees be 
“fairly balanced” was justiciable, the provision that there be 
“appropriate provisions to assure that the advice and 
recommendations of the advisory committee . . . not be 
inappropriately influenced . . . by any special interest” was not 
justiciable because it was “committed to agency discretion by law”99 
by virtue of lacking a “meaningful standard against which to judge 
the agency’s exercise of discretion.”100 Specifically, the court 
reasoned that the plaintiffs were really alleging that because the 
Governor had nominated so many of the RAC members, he would 
have undue influence over the decisions and recommendations of the 
RAC.101 The court then determined that Congress had provided no 
guidance for determining whether such “hypothetical future 
influence” would be inappropriate, and that the issue was therefore 
nonjusticiable.102
IV. ANALYSIS 
This opinion by the Tenth Circuit represents the latest federal 
circuit court analysis on the issue of reviewability of agency actions 
under FACA. Unfortunately, by holding that the “inappropriate 
influence” claim was not justiciable, the court likely missed an 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1237. 
 98. Id. at 1229–30. 
 99. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000). 
 100. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). 
 101. Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1231. 
 102. Id. at 1231–32. 
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opportunity to set a compelling precedent that would ensure the 
independence of advisory committees and protect them from agency 
capture. This Part explains how the court came to its conclusion by 
failing to consider FACA’s legislative history and by 
mischaracterizing the plaintiffs’ “inappropriate influence” claim as an 
“unfair balance claim.” In addition, this Part discusses why the 
singular circumstances of this case, in which the plaintiffs impute the 
role of “special interest” to the Governor, should not affect the 
analysis. Finally, this Part conjectures that future courts will not likely 
uphold similar claims of FACA violations, even if they find them 
justiciable. 
A. Why Judicial Review Best Effectuates Congressional Intent 
The Tenth Circuit in Wenker held that the “inappropriate 
influence” provision of FACA was not justiciable because there was 
no guidance from Congress on what the provision meant.103 In other 
words, the court claimed to have no way of knowing whether 
upholding the plaintiffs’ “inappropriate influence” claim was the type 
of grievance Congress sought to redress by enacting that provision. 
Instead the court held that the claim would best be addressed under 
the “fair balance” provision. A review of the legislative history of 
FACA demonstrates that Congress intended the “inappropriate 
influence” provision to address the plaintiffs’ particular type of claim. 
In addition, the facts in Wenker illustrate why the plaintiffs’ claim 
could properly be addressed only by that provision. This Section 
explains how both of these aspects weigh in favor of justiciability. 
1. The legislative history of the “inappropriate influence” provision 
By holding the “inappropriate influence” provision in section 
5(b)(3) of FACA to be nonjusticiable, the Tenth Circuit departed 
from its own precedent by disregarding the legislative history of the 
Act. Specifically, the court held that the agency’s decision was 
“committed to agency discretion”—and thus not justiciable under 
the APA104—based on the court’s finding that Congress provided 
“no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s 
 103. Id. 
 104. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000). 
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exercise of discretion.”105 While the text of the statute itself may not 
reveal the “meaningful standard” the court sought, an earlier Tenth 
Circuit case identified legislative history as a viable source for such 
congressional guidance.106 FACA’s legislative history indicates that 
Congress intended the Act to prevent the precise type of violation 
alleged. Nevertheless, the court omitted references to both its earlier 
case and the legislative history from its “inappropriate influence” 
discussion.
The Tenth Circuit’s approach to interpreting section 5(b)(3) of 
FACA demonstrates why the court found no “meaningful standard.” 
The plaintiffs in Wenker argued that the BLM had violated the 
“inappropriate influence” provision by selecting a disproportionate 
number of the Governor’s nominees to serve on the RACs.107 The 
Governor, the plaintiffs claimed, was a special interest who would be 
able to exert an inappropriately large amount of influence over the 
RACs “by virtue of having nominated or endorsed such a large 
percentage of the membership.”108 The court, however, did not view 
section 5(b)(3) to be related to selection of membership. Instead, 
the court read the provision to deal with direct attempts to control 
committee work from outside the committee’s membership. An 
example of this would be “bribes or threats from a recommending 
interest group to its nominee,” which, of course, was never 
alleged.109 The court concluded that whether the “kind of 
hypothetical future influence” that was alleged should be considered 
“inappropriate” within the meaning of the statute was an issue on 
which the court had “absolutely no guidance, guidelines, or 
standards from Congress.”110 Had the court looked beyond the 
simple text of the statute and considered the legislative history, 
however, it likely would have found that guidance. 
The Tenth Circuit earlier found it appropriate to search 
legislative history for the “meaningful standards” from Congress that 
are necessary for finding a challenge to an agency decision 
 105. Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1231 (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830). 
 106. See Am. Bank v. Clarke, 933 F.2d 899, 902 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Block v. 
Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984)). 
 107. Wenker, 353 F.2d at 1230. 
 108. Id. at 1231. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1232. 
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justiciable.111 In American Bank v. Clark, the Tenth Circuit held that 
a decision by the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency to enter a 
closure order was “committed to agency discretion” and not 
justiciable under section 701(a)(2) of the APA.112 The court quoted 
a Supreme Court case stating that “[w]hether and to what extent a 
particular statute precludes review is determined not only from its 
express language, but also from . . . its legislative history.”113 The 
court then applied this approach by examining the “language of the 
statute,” the “structure of the Act,” and the “goals” that “Congress 
sought to achieve” by passing the statute.114 Despite this illustrative 
precedent, the Tenth Circuit failed to examine the legislative history 
of FACA in Wenker. 
The Tenth Circuit claimed in Wenker that Congress provided 
“absolutely no guidance” as to what kind of influence should be 
considered “inappropriate” under section 5(b)(3) of FACA.115 
However, the legislative history of FACA indicates that the influence 
an entity might wield by having nominated a disproportionate 
number of committee members—essentially the allegation in 
Wenker—is exactly the type of influence Congress aimed to prevent. 
In a report to the House of Representatives on FACA, the House 
Committee on Government Operations stated that “[p]articularly 
important among the guidelines are the requirement contained in § 
[5](b)(2) . . . and the requirement contained in § [5](b)(3) . . . .”116 
The report explained their importance by warning that “[o]ne of the 
great dangers in the unregulated use of advisory committees is that 
special interest groups may use their membership on such bodies . . . 
to exercise undue influence upon the Government through the 
dominance of advisory committees.”117 The report illustrated this 
danger by citing a case in which a particular advisory committee 
included members from only one industry; the report assured 
Congress that FACA would prohibit “the heavy representation of 
 111. American Bank, 933 F.2d at 902. 
 112. Id. at 900–02. 
 113. Id. at 902 (quoting Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984)). 
 114. Id. at 903. 
 115. Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1232. 
 116. H. R. REP. NO. 92-1017 (1972), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 6, at 276. 
 117. Id. (emphasis added). 
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parties whose private interests could influence their 
recommendations.”118
This concern over disproportionate representation also appeared 
in the Senate’s discussion. A study submitted to the congressional 
record warned that advisory committees “can be a convenient 
nesting place for special interests seeking to change and preserve a 
federal policy for their own ends” and that “[s]uch committees 
stacked with giants in their respective fields can overwhelm federal 
decision makers.”119 Thus, members of both the House and Senate 
expressed apprehension that interest groups could manipulate public 
policy by installing a disproportionate number of their own 
representatives on advisory committees. In spite of this record, the 
Wenker court did not mention the legislative history and maintained 
that Congress had provided no guidance.120
Just because the court did not address the legislative history in its 
opinion, however, does not necessarily mean the court ignored it 
completely. The court may not have referred to the legislative history 
if it believed the above quoted passages did not apply to 5(b)(3)’s 
“inappropriate influence” provision but only to 5(b)(2)’s “unfair 
balance” provision. The court did suggest that the plaintiff’s 5(b)(3) 
claims should have been addressed under “unfair balance,”121 and 
this view would be consistent with the opinions of Judges Silberman 
and Edwards in Microbiological Criteria.122 Other factors, of course, 
weigh against taking such an approach. The legislative history itself 
never separates the two provisions in this manner, and Judge 
Friedman applied language from the legislative history specifically to 
section 5(b)(3).123 If, as the court suggested, section 5(b)(2) 
adequately satisfies both Congress’s and the plaintiffs’ concerns, and 
the legislative history does not apply to 5(b)(3), that would leave 
5(b)(3) without any “judicially meaningful standards” and hence 
unjusticiable. The next Section explains why some of Congress’s 
 118. Id. (emphasis added). 
 119. CONG. REC. S14, 644–55 (1972), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 6, at 205 
(emphasis added). 
 120. Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1232. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Public Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 
886 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Silberman, J., concurring); id. at 432–34 (Edwards, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); supra text accompanying note 70. 
 123. See Microbiological Criteria, 886 F.2d at 425 (Friedman, J., concurring) (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 92-1017, at 6; 118 CONG. REC. 30,276 (1972)). 
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concerns over disproportionate representation can adequately be 
addressed only by giving independent significance to the 
“inappropriate influence” provision in cases such as Wenker. 
2. Properly distinguishing the “fair balance” provision 
The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ “inappropriate influence” 
claim because, in the court’s view, it was not justiciable and was 
really a claim of “unfair balance.”124 However, the particular facts in 
Wenker reveal a critical distinction between the claimed violation and 
what the “unfair balance” provision addresses. This Section explains 
the court’s conception of the statute, the nature of the claim, and 
why the claim would properly be addressed under the “inappropriate 
influence” provision. 
According to the court, FACA’s “inappropriate influence” 
provision protects advisory committees from active, external 
influences and is unrelated to committee membership.125 Under this 
conception, the provision may prevent special interests from 
pressuring committee members to vote in a particular way on 
pending issues, but it would have nothing to do with membership 
selection. As Judge Silberman stated, “[T]he provision presupposes 
that an advisory committee is already in existence and ‘fairly 
balanced’ in accordance with section 5(b)(2).”126 According to the 
claim, on the other hand, the provision should also protect against 
indirect, structural influences.127 Under this alternative conception, 
even if the Governor never directly involved himself with the 
committees again, he nevertheless already would have left an 
indelible mark on the RACs by having installed a disproportionate 
number of members—all of whom presumably share many of the 
Governor’s views on land use and environmental issues. 
The court stated that this second type of grievance should be 
addressed under section 5(b)(2), which requires a fair balance “in 
terms of the points of view represented.”128 The text of 5(b)(2) 
facially supports the court’s conclusion; if all the nominees share the 
Governor’s views, that would result in an imbalance of viewpoints. 
 124. Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1232. 
 125. See id. at 1231. 
 126. Microbiological Criteria, 886 F.2d at 430 (Silberman, J., concurring). 
 127. See Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1231. 
 128. Id. at 1232. 
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However, because of the difficulty in discerning a “virtually 
infinite”129 array of “points of view,” courts have interpreted the 
provision to require instead a balance of represented interests as 
proxy.130 Under this interpretation, even if the majority of committee 
members shared similar personal views, the committee would still 
comply with the “fair balance” provision as long as they represented 
a balanced variety of interest groups. 
In most cases, where the nominating entity is the same as the 
represented interest, the “fair balance” provision as interpreted 
would prevent a single entity from selecting a disproportionate 
number of committee members. If, however, the chosen members 
represent interests different from the entity that nominated them, 
the “fair balance” provision may be inadequate. In Wenker, the court 
never suggested that nominees represented the Governor; they 
represented their respective employers and affiliated organizations.131 
Assuming that the Governor chose individuals from a variety of 
organizations, the RACs would satisfy section 5(b)(2) for being 
“fairly balanced” in terms of the interests represented. The problem 
would remain, however, that the Governor hand picked a 
disproportionate number of RAC members—members who are likely 
to share his own views on land management and environmental 
issues. While the committees would be “fairly balanced” in terms of 
represented interests, the Governor would have had an enormous 
impact on their work by selecting so many of their members. Thus, 
neither the plaintiffs’ claims in Wenker nor Congress’s concerns in 
the legislative history were adequately addressed by the “fair 
balance” provision. To remedy this problem, the “inappropriate 
influence” provision should be given independent significance with 
respect to selecting committee members. 
B. Government Entities as Special Interests 
When the plaintiffs in Wenker charged the BLM with allowing a 
“special interest” to influence the selection of RAC members, they 
 129. Microbiological Criteria, 886 F.2d at 426 (Silberman, J., concurring). 
 130. Id. at 423 (Friedman, J., concurring) (citing Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Executive 
Comm., 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
 131. See Wenker, 353 F.3d at 1225–26 (describing the three groups of interests RAC 
members were to represent, including industry, environmental protection, and the general 
public). 
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did not point to a large corporation or private industry as the 
culprit—entities usually associated with the term “special interest”—
but to the Governor of Colorado. Section 5(b)(3) of FACA requires 
“that the advice and recommendations to the advisory committee 
. . . not be inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or 
by any special interest.” The plaintiffs’ claim raises the question of 
whether a government actor should be considered a “special 
interest” under FACA or in general. The court in Wenker did not 
address this issue likely because it did not find the claim to be 
justiciable; but if the claim is justiciable, the question becomes 
critical. If Congress had intended for the “inappropriate influence” 
provision to apply only to “private” entities, then the Governor’s 
actions would be no violation because he would not be considered a 
“special interest.” While members of Congress may not have had 
state Governors in mind when they enacted FACA, no meaningful 
distinction likely exists, and the provision against “special interests” 
should apply equally to “public” and “private” entities. 
As a practical matter, public officials should not be presumed 
always to be acting in the best interests of the public. According to 
one of the central tenets of public choice theory, a branch of 
economics and political science, government officials operate as 
rational, self-interested economic actors just as private entities do.132 
Under this theory, both are presumed to make rational, economic 
decisions to promote their respective interests. Just as private 
business owners seek to maximize profits, government agencies seek 
to maximize their regulatory authority or their budget.133 Politicians 
 132. For a general discussion of public choice theory, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the Lens of Public Choice, 12 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 284 (1992) (recognizing both the potential and limits to understanding 
both law and law making through public choice theory); Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of 
Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328 (1994). For 
a more in depth discussion, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS 
OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (Univ. of Mich. 
Press 1965) (1962), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/ 
buchCv3Contents.html. 
 133. For application of public choice theory to administrative law in particular, see THE 
BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE (André Blais & Stéphane 
Dion eds., 1991); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC 
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 23-25 (1997); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY 
AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 640–41 (6th ed., 2003) (1973); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating 
the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. 
4ABBOTT.FIN 11/18/2005 1:10 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
1070 
  
seek to please their constituencies and to be reelected. Public choice 
theory holds that while altruistic efforts to serve the “public good” 
may occur, the driving motivation of public entities comes from 
these more practical concerns. Therefore, under this theory, the 
Governor would be most likely to nominate to the RACs individuals 
whom he believes will best serve his political interests. 
If, as public choice theory suggests, the Governor primarily seeks 
the interests of his constituents, he may qualify as a “special interest” 
to the extent that those interests are not universal. The Governor’s 
constituency may have different values and priorities than the general 
public; he may promote the interests of his political base over those 
of the state in general or those of the state over those affected in 
other states. For example, if a Governor owes her successful election 
to people who favor promoting local industries over environmental 
protection, her RAC nominees may reflect that view to the detriment 
of environmental resources and those who rely on them.134 As Judge 
Silberman noted in Microbiological Criteria, the term “special 
interest” serves primarily “as a political pejorative (typically referring 
to an interest of which the speaker disapproves).”135 Thus, the 
Governor’s interests are just as likely as a private entity’s to be 
“special” and fall within the scope of the “inappropriate influence” 
provision. 
The Fifth Circuit has also expressed the view that government 
entities should be considered “special interests” for purposes of 
preventing “inappropriate influences.”136 In Cargill, the Fifth Circuit 
was “troubled” that two members of an advisory committee were 
allowed to participate in a study on diesel exhaust while interviewing 
for jobs with government agencies “whose regulatory authority 
Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549 
(2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. 
L. REV. 271 (1986). 
 134. Several commentators have noted with particular apprehension the implications of 
public choice principles applied to environmental and land use policy. See Michael C. Blumm, 
Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why “Multiple Use” Failed, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 405 (1994); Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the 
Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1998); Sandra Zellmer, A Preservation Paradox: 
Political Prestidigitation and an Enduring Resource of Wildness, 34 ENVTL. L. 1015 (2004) 
Sheila Lynch, Note and Comment, The Federal Advisory Committee Act: An Obstacle to 
Ecosystem Management by Federal Agencies?, 71 WASH. L. REV. 431 (1996) (arguing for more 
restrictive application of FACA to groups that advise on land policy issues). 
 135. Microbiological Criteria, 886 F.2d at 430 (Silberman, J., concurring). 
 136. See Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 339 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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[would] be directly affected by the results of the diesel study.”137 
While the court did not view only two of the fifteen members as 
rising to the level of “inappropriate influence,” it nevertheless 
recognized the danger of allowing public entities with a stake in 
advisory committee work to have an influence.138 Therefore, both 
political theory and the reasoning of this Fifth Circuit case indicate 
that a government actor such as the Governor should be considered 
just as much a “special interest” as any private entity. 
C. Prognosis for Future Cases 
The Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Wenker suggests that courts in 
future FACA cases are actually likely to review but rarely uphold 
“inappropriate influence” claims whether or not they find such 
claims to be justiciable. The court’s approach in Wenker illustrates 
how concluding that an agency’s action is not reviewable often 
requires an analysis as detailed as, and often indistinguishable from, 
an actual review of the agency’s action. Even if a court does find a 
claim to be reviewable, however, it is unlikely to overturn the 
agency’s decision because of the relatively high standard of review. 
Even on a cursory reading, the court in Wenker appeared to be 
reviewing the “inappropriate influence” claim even though it 
ultimately concluded that claims under that provision are not 
reviewable.139 The court went into a detailed analysis of the facts, 
considered possible interpretations of the statute, and hypothesized 
as to what types of actions would violate the provision140—all 
components of a full-fledged judicial review. At least one 
commentator has observed this phenomenon in cases where courts 
have held that an agency “action is unreviewable if and only if 
judicial review of the decision would be infeasible.”141 Such cases 
include Overton Park and Heckler, where the Supreme Court held 
that there must be “no law to apply”142 or “no meaningful standards 
from Congress.”143 In such cases, “a court cannot find an agency 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1231 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Levin, supra note 21, at 734. 
 142. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). 
 143. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). 
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action unreviewable without thinking about the substance of the 
challenger’s contentions—that is, reviewing the action.”144 Thus, as a 
practical matter, courts that find “inappropriate influence” claims to 
be nonjusticiable will still have to actually review the claims. 
Even if future courts disagree with Wenker and find the 
“inappropriate influence” provision to be justiciable, they are 
unlikely often to uphold a claim on the merits due to deference for 
agency decisions. For a court to overturn an agency’s decision, the 
APA requires a finding that the agency’s action is “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law.”145 While a court may still find that an agency has abused 
its discretion under FACA by creating patently unbalanced advisory 
committees or by allowing a single interest to endorse a 
disproportionate number of committee members, such cases will 
likely be rare. The court in Wenker ultimately remanded the case to 
determine whether the nomination by the Governor of thirteen of 
the fourteen appointees violated the “fair balance” provision,146 but 
courts in less extreme cases likely will defer to agency selections 
under the APA’s standard. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When Congress passed FACA, one of its clear intentions was to 
protect advisory committees from becoming a tool of agency 
capture. Congress recognized at the time that “an invitation to 
advise can by subtle steps confer the power to regulate and 
legislate.”147 Therefore, Congress incorporated provisions into FACA 
that it hoped would assure fairly balanced advisory committees that 
would be immune from inappropriate influences by special interests. 
For an ally in the struggle against agency capture and as an enforcer 
of these provisions, Congress has had to rely on the courts. And the 
courts’ primary weapon in the arsenal against agency capture has 
long been a strong presumption in favor of judicial review of agency 
actions. 
 144. Levin, supra note 21, at 735. 
 145. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). 
 146. Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1237 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 147. 92 CONG. REC. S14644-55 (1972), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 6, at 
205 (quoting Congressman Monagan). 
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By finding a claim based on section 5(b)(3) of FACA to be 
unjusticiable, the Tenth Circuit took a step toward undermining this 
presumption. The court based this step on the APA provision 
prohibiting judicial review on issues that are committed to agency 
discretion, even though that provision is poorly elucidated in both 
the legislative history and prior court decisions. In addition, the 
court’s decision disregarded Congress’s clear intent to make an 
inappropriate-influence violation out of an agency action that allows 
a single interest to select a disproportionate number of advisory 
committee members. Finally, the court appeared to say one thing 
and do the opposite when it engaged in a review of the issue to 
determine that the issue was unreviewable. While a future court may 
find the Tenth Circuit’s precedent persuasive when faced with the 
difficult decision of whether to grant judicial review of an agency 
action under section 5(b)(3) of FACA, hopefully it will consider how 
its decision will further or detract from Congress’s struggle against 
the dangers of agency capture. 
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